

ethnography as thought

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed.

—Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*

An Entry

Where do we start thinking? Which are the encounters that enable new concepts to be sensed?

let's see. when we came in there was a huge number of brits and some rich indians and a few backpackers, still very few tranceheads. so it wasn't entirely sure whether it would get to be a "good party," in the sense that the party would survive the morning and thus become magical. i met t— when it was starting to get light. he was sitting at the banyan tree with some japanese guys, and he said, after he'd seen that dark indian trancehead with long hair, isn't it a coincidence, every time he decides to go party every so often, at that time, it turns out that the people he knows also go there. perfect telepathic timing. a good sign, he said, it's going to be a great party, i don't know but i've got a feeling, and he decided to take a quarter of a hofmann [LSD]. we smoked some chillum and joints and for sure, the israelis trickled in, they sat next to the bar on the right on two mats (i mean, two mat businesses) waiting patiently, like on new year, [this time] not really for the indians to disappear but for an adequate MOMENTUM, enough compatriots and other rave psychotics to claim the party.

This comes from field notes. They were about an open-air party for tourists at a ground called Dolce Vita, in a Goan village called Anjuna.



India.

The notes are probably puzzling at first sight. Why Anjuna? What's with the Israelis, and Japanese avoiding Indians? What are "tranceheads," and why are they watching out for Israelis to turn up at the party? Why do they wait for Indians to leave? What does a "magical morning" consist of? What is a "mat business"? How does "momentum" of ravers come about? And why were these notes written down in the first place? Why

does a half-Belgian-half-Indian guy go study foreign ravers in some third-world village?

This sort of puzzlement forces a reassessment of what one knows. Anjuna's music and drugs tourism is legendary and it is probably the only village in the third world that brought forth an own kind of electronic dance music, Goa trance, which is played at outdoor parties across the globe. Goa trance makes a fascinating case study in cultural geography. It appeared shortly after house and techno music established themselves in the United Kingdom and other European countries around 1990, but the conditions for Anjuna's trance scene go back to the early seventies. The coastal village was "discovered" by hippie travelers at a time when there was much interest in the mind-altering qualities of India. Although Goa is generally considered "less Indian" by tourists because of more than 460 years of Portuguese colonial influence, the hippies eagerly took to its tranquil tropical beaches and tolerant locals. By 1975 Anjuna was a secluded haven for a semi-resident community of hippies who could freely indulge in drugs, nude sunbathing, and all-night full-moon parties. Music was always central to Anjuna's tourism, but it was with Goa trance that it boomed. Goa's festive image long attracted large numbers of domestic tourists too. Charter tourism from the UK and other European countries was consolidated at about the same time that Goa trance became available in large music stores in Europe, in 1995. What began with Goa regulars simulating Anjuna's parties in their home countries grew into a transnational underground rave/club scene, stretching from Tel Aviv to Stockholm, from Brasília to Cape Town.

The excerpt above describes a key attraction in Anjuna's music and drugs tourism: sunrise. This is when for many dancers the party only begins, in part because for others—mostly middle-class Indian tourists—it is the time to leave. At this particular party, Dolce Vita was unusually charging an entry fee, hence there were hardly any Indian tourists. In fact, it was probably deliberate policy to limit their number. This is because the hard core of party revelers, who stay in Anjuna for months, would rather there was just them and the local women selling tea at the parties. In the perception of this hard core, charter tourists and especially domestic tourists lack an affective connection to Goa trance, LSD, personal style, and budget traveling. Ravers like T. are almost obsessed with protocol and with making the party just right. They are quite serious about what Goa means to them: a place to be transformed in. Domestic tourists are not there to transform themselves and are therefore unwelcome. What the experienced ravers do (unlike the mostly British charter tourists and



Goa.

backpackers) is wait on the mats supplied by the local women, until dawn makes the Indians leave.

I felt this segregation. It was what annoyed and frightened me, and it was what spurred me on. I realize now, a couple of years later, that my thinking on race was at the very least accelerated through the intensities of my ethnographic fieldwork. I wanted to make sense of what I encountered. This book wants to find out what sort of theoretical vocabulary is needed to make sense of racism when it's not supposed to be there. It turns out that making sense of Anjuna needed some new concepts, and a theoretical reconsideration of race itself. So, why Anjuna? To form new concepts.

The Concepts

It is by observing the event of a party as something fully physical that I could appreciate the segregation of the morning. Nobody likes to talk about it, and hardly anyone has described it in writing. What matters is therefore not the representations of an event, but its actual unfolding. I had to be there, among other bodies, checking what they were doing, what they did with mats and chillums (traditional Indian hash pipes) and trees and the Goa trance flowing through the landscape. I had to find out where they were sitting and dancing, how their appearances differed, why they were looking at each other all the time. What is it that gave ravers' bodies "momentum"? Three conditions: that they were dancing and on drugs—a question of the *embodiments* of rave tourism; that they cared about looks and who was around them—a question of familiar *faces*; and that their skin color betrayed where they come from, by and large rich countries such as the UK, Japan, Israel, and Germany—a question of *locations*. Embodiment, face, and location are three theoretical principles that will structure the present study.

A fourth concept that will be introduced, and perhaps the most salient one, is *viscosity*. Viscosity enables a rigorous grasping of social spaces by putting the dynamic physicality of human bodies and their interactions at the forefront of analysis. In basic terms, viscosity pertains to two dimensions of a collective of bodies: its sticking together, and its relative impermeability. At that Dolce Vita party, at 8 a.m. on January 6, 2000, there was a viscosity of predominantly white ravers. They stuck together in time and space because they all saw each other regularly, smoked chillum together, danced to Goa trance, wore flashy clothing, and had money to spend on LSD and Ecstasy. Others, especially domestic tourists, weren't

habituated to all this; they didn't have the cultural or economic resources to join in. When the sun came up, most Indians felt visible and out of place between so many white bodies. The denser the collective, the more difficult to cut through it: these are the two dimensions of viscosity. There is no downright exclusion; Israeli and Japanese bodies might be more ambivalently white than Germans or Canadians. Still, the net effect is that there is a strong tendency of dancers to be white. Therefore, the observable fact that the Indians leave is a contingent effect of music, subcultural rules, mutual stereotypes, economic inequality, and differential experiences with drugs.

The problem I want to address is why viscosity of white bodies comes about in Anjuna. After all, Goa is popularly known as a former hippie hangout—isn't it all peace and love, aren't those backpackers and ravers really into India, is Goa trance not the most cosmopolitan of electronic dance musics? Why would a white microcosm be re-created if the whole point of going to India and Goa is adventure, escape, becoming different? This book attempts to explain how it is that countercultural experimentations with music, drugs, and travel can coexist with the reinstatement of where one is coming from, of who one is. Young whites are in Anjuna seemingly to sample and develop a lifestyle quite different from what they're used to, but the way they do this betrays the limits of their escape and rebellion; that is, by virtue of being tourists in an exotic place, recognizably different and wealthy in a poor country, they contribute to the inertia of old racial divisions. Studying the parties in Anjuna will pave the way to an understanding of whiteness that stresses its inherent capacity to spread, change itself, and become unexpectedly viscous.

The set of practices of self-transformation that I will focus on will be called *psychedelics*—in the singular, like “economics” and “aesthetics.” *Psychedelics* is the hedonistic, sometimes mystical structure of feeling that, as the name implies, was epitomized in the sixties cult of LSD. But I enlarge the term significantly: insofar as whites use the pleasures of drugs, art, ritual, travel, the risky, and the exotic to alter their minds and position in the world as whites, I'll call them *psychedelic*. The fact that bodies involved in *psychedelics* can be Swedish, Israeli, Japanese, Indian, Canadian, or Zimbabwean does not make *psychedelics* less white. What is significant is that these bodies are most *probably* white. Hence *psychedelics* isn't anti-theoretical to white modernity. On the contrary, to argue for the creativity of whiteness is to show to what extent it can reinvent and reinforce itself. The ethnography will demonstrate how the viscosity of whites can arise from the fact that they succeed in mutating themselves. *Psychedelics* shows the many possibilities of whiteness.

Here I need to mention the last theoretical concept of the book, derived mostly from Gilles Deleuze: *virtuality*. Deleuze produced a long string of concepts that in their sheer intensity and variation innovated philosophy, but it was virtuality that they were all implicating. Briefly, virtuality refers to the connections that things are potentially capable of. Virtuality is tendency, probability, latency. Without a concept of virtuality, the analysis of whiteness cannot appreciate how it comes to be—and why it seems so difficult to dismantle. Whiteness gathers its strength from being versatile, not from mere ruthless oppression. I will attempt to understand whiteness in order to change it; my concept of the concept is, then, more pragmatic than Deleuze's. If I'd produce a similar proliferous network of concepts as he did, I think they would prove pretty short-lived. By limiting myself to a rather more austere conceptual set, it's my hope that the engagement with it will be easier.

The Argument

Although the human sciences have been ardent in criticizing the inequalities that remain in place because of race, what race actually is often elides analysis and commentary. According to the dominant paradigm, race is necessarily “constructed” through language and culture, so what it is “itself” cannot be known. What then counts, in human geography, cultural studies, anthropology, and sociology, is often the discourse on, media images of, people's opinions about race, instead of the realities of embodiment, face, and location. Thus Richard Dyer's *White* has discussed cinematic representations of whites and shown how whiteness is insubstantial without a profound symbolism of virtue and control.¹ The work of Dyer and others in white studies has been valuable in exposing how whites have historically erased their own racial specificity. Although blacks and reds are colored, that is, deviations from white, whites are just human. Humanity is itself defined on white terms.

My study falls under white studies, but I will take issue with the latter's theoretical basis, what is commonly called social constructionism. Against positivism and realism, social constructionism holds that the meaning of social and even physical phenomena is not given once and for all, but depends on how they are understood in society. In its critical versions, social constructionism studies how different groups struggle over the meanings of phenomena such as whiteness, nation, poverty, and disease. Social constructionism, then, tends to understand these phenomena primarily through their ideas, their representations in language and images. Against pure idealism, social constructionists hold that these representations are

not mere fictions or fantasies, as they have “real effects.” However, how these effects occur (for example, what impact cinematic depictions of whites have on actual people in real space and time) is usually left unscrutinized. My ethnography attempts to grasp the geographies of social/physical reality as constituted *only* by “real effects.” Whites taking up the dance floor in the morning and somehow managing to dispel Indians again and again in Anjuna is hardly a question of representation. Psychedelics is primarily about what happens to bodies and how it is that these bodies tend to be white, even if these bodies are using “representations.” The first, obvious way that the analysis here differs from most research following the constructionist paradigm lies in that it tries to address race as an event, not how it is known through discourse or in people’s minds. When analyzed as an event, whiteness in Anjuna can be shown to be both creative and constricting. I think it will become evident, as the book progresses, that only ethnography could establish the conceptual imbrication of psychedelics and viscosity.

It is a commonplace assumption that whites have for a long time been fascinated and transformed by drawing on other people’s cultures and landscapes. These fascinations and transformations have been notably given systematic attention in Edward Said’s *Orientalism*.² Yet the fact that white appropriations of otherness were fueled by a conscious effort to transcend the constraints of white society—that European exoticism and primitivism, though intertwined with colonial subjugation, also tell of the self-critique and self-transformation of whites—has seldom been put at the center of theorization. The second way in which this book departs from most theories of race is that whiteness is treated as something positive; that is, it is much more than simply the negation of nonwhiteness. White racism will need to be conceived as a system involving not just exclusion, but more complex shades of differentiation and interaction prior to any distinction between self and other, West and East.

Usually in the constructionist paradigm, instead of virtuality and creativity, the oppressive and rigid nature of racial boundaries is emphasized. For many theorists of race today, such as Paul Gilroy, race is always already racist because it is fundamentally about drawing a sharp boundary between white and nonwhite. Hence Gilroy’s title: *Against Race*.³ Populations have been “othered” as inferior or evil by white people, a process that was institutionalized and globalized during European imperialism and American slavery but continues to inform current portrayals of nonwhites in insidious ways. Race is just one way of classifying humans, and from this Gilroy concludes that a future without it is conceivable and desirable. In contradistinction to this kind of antiracism, and as a third

departure from social constructionism, this book calls not for an abolishing of the idea of race, but its critical reappropriation so as to combat racism more adequately. The ethnography will give evidence toward a conception of race as a heterogeneous process of differentiation involving the materiality of bodies and spaces.

What this study seeks to do, in short, is formulate a materialist theory of race. The ethnographic description and reflection will draw attention to events and constellations in Anjuna that permit, or rather encourage, thinking race in terms of bodies and spaces. I built my conceptual apparatus with ample aid from Deleuze, who, unlike most theorists of race and colonialism, doesn't ground his thought in negativity and representation. To anticipate my theoretical conclusion, race is a shifting amalgamation of human bodies and their appearance, genetic material, artifacts, landscapes, music, money, language, and states of mind. Racial difference emerges when bodies with certain characteristics become viscous through the ways they connect to their physical and social environment. Race is a machinic assemblage, to use a concept of Deleuze's collaborator Félix Guattari. Machinic assemblage is an ontological concept and therefore apt for tackling the question "What is race?" Basically, the concept presents constellations, especially biological and sociological constellations, as fully material, machinelike interlockings of multiple varied components, which do not cease to be different from each other while assembled. A machine in the narrow sense works because bolts are bolts and cogs are cogs. Thus, there is order—for example, there is a relatively stable constellation that can be called whiteness—but order is a shifting effect of many little connections and flows.

The whiteness of the space and bodies at *Dolce Vita* was achieved through components such as skin color, cannabis, tea, sunlight, conversation, trees, entry charge, and dancing skills. What is more important than distinctions between nature and nurture, or innate and environmental, or culture and economy, is how an assemblage functions, how it manages to emerge and persist in its own right. A consequence of thinking race as a machinic assemblage is that the phenotype of bodies cannot be something incidental to how bodies act as vehicles for racial differences: phenotype matters. Deleuze has a powerful notion of virtuality that enables conceiving matter such as phenotype as active and full of potentiality, instead of completely curtailed or frozen by "discourse."

My philosophical sources are not restricted to Deleuze and Guattari. Prior to them, feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz and Adrienne Rich taught me how to affirm the differential materiality of bodies. As in feminism, the theorization of the body presented here is linked to a political and

ethical project of reorganizing human differences, so that privilege is not an automatic implication of one's corporeality or where one comes from. It is not that the dominant constructionist conceptions of race and gender actively prevents this, of course. But it certainly seems that a more rigorous understanding of the material dynamics of privilege based on phenotype—what is race?—can contribute to such a project.

Crucial to my ethnography will be the understanding of *emergence*, which I treat as a subcategory of virtuality. Far from being fixed in either genes or culture, racial difference emerges through a host of processes at different levels of organization. The concept of viscosity, moreover, allows for a fundamentally spatial way of imagining race, as opposed to collapsing it into a disembodied and mental contraction, as tends to be done in much theory. In the last chapter, I will briefly take issue with Frantz Fanon's conception of race and his lasting influence on critical race theory. By positing race as primarily a dialectical system of exclusion and recognition (self versus other), theorists have failed to appreciate the entangled and effervescent nature of both race and racism. Understanding the complex materiality of race means abandoning the basically Hegelian perspective on human difference that continues to inspire much of critical theory.

Instead of identity politics and a downright negation of whiteness, or a celebration of hybridity and anarchy, or a regime of multiculturalism and tolerance, the politics that follows from my ethnography acknowledges that an escape from whiteness can perversely reinforce it—as happens in Anjuna. But that is no reason to deny its emancipatory possibilities. Whiteness and race need to be understood and proliferated in new ways, not abolished or denied. In contrast to what is usually expected of bringing phenotype back into the human sciences, therefore, this study asserts that a materialist (or machinic) analysis of race cannot be appropriated by eugenics or biological essentialism, while it can definitely contribute to the battle against white supremacy. It was during my encounter with Anjuna that my thinking on race slowly started forming. In fact, rave culture and hippie travel might be the quintessential places to start thinking the strange materiality of race.

Freaking Whiteness

And already I am being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am *fixed*.

—Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*

Inclusive Racism

The most influential thinker of racial difference remains Frantz Fanon. In *Black Skins, White Masks* Fanon argued persuasively that in our racist world, blacks are imprisoned by something akin to what I termed a visual economy, the terms of which are defined by whites. Thanks to the influence of Merleau-Ponty, Fanon is better suited for studying racial embodiment than the strongly Lacanian theories of race and colonialism that developed in his wake. In the famous “train passage,” Fanon presents racism as from the start a matter of reiterative Goffmanian encounters, of visible phenotype, differential privilege, cultural stereotyping, and emotions like shame, anger, and disgust—much as in my ethnography.¹ Among others, Linda Martín Alcoff has followed this thread in Fanon and argues for race’s embodied realities:

Phenomenological descriptions of racial identity can reveal a differentiation or distribution of felt connectedness to others. Kerouac’s sadness is prompted by his lack of felt connection, a connection he may have anticipated when initiating his walk through the black and Mexican neighbourhoods, but one that does not present itself. However, felt connection is a complex issue, undetermined solely by phenotype. The felt connectedness to visibly similar others may produce either flight or empathic identification or other possible dispositions.²

Fanon's own focus is on blackness. The condition of blacks is pathological, for Fanon, in that their racialized bodies will never be accepted as belonging to the dominant white culture. At the same time, blacks are not allowed to transform themselves on their own terms either. This existential deadlock is what Fanon calls "the fact of blackness".³ The way out of this impasse can only be a color-blind universalism, a radical recognition of common species being:

In effect, what happens is this: As I begin to recognize that the Negro is the symbol of sin, I catch myself hating the Negro. But then I recognize that I am a Negro. There are two ways out of this conflict. Either I ask others to pay no attention to my skin, or else I want them to be aware of it. I try then to find value for what is bad—since I have unthinkingly conceded that the black man is the color of evil. In order to terminate this neurotic situation, in which I am compelled to choose an unhealthy, conflictual solution, fed on fantasies, hostile, inhuman in short, I have only one solution: to rise above this absurd drama that others have staged around me, to reject the two terms that are equally unacceptable, and, through one human being, to reach out for the universal.⁴

My disagreement is not with Fanon's and Martín Alcoff's insistence on embodiment and emotion, but with their reliance on a Hegelian notion of recognition to explain encounter. Because of this they tend to treat white and nonwhite not only as a dyad, but as almost naturally opposed entities. There is, then, little attention paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations *become* dominant, that is, how racial formations emerge from material conditions and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the spatiality of self versus other. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of faciality is not based on an intersubjective dialectics enlarged to world-historical scope. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari strongly distance themselves from phenomenology and psychoanalysis. First of all, for them, it isn't consciousness but an abstract machine of faciality that arranges bodies into relations of power. And second, faciality constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries such as black/white (though binarization can be an important effect). That is precisely its strength. There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains.

Deleuze and Guattari believe faciality's imperialism arose with institutional Christianity. Being imposed in lands populated by different phenotypes, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization. That faciality

originated in Renaissance humanism and depictions of Jesus seems a plausible if one-sided interpretation. It is less relevant than Deleuze and Guattari's unusual theory of contemporary racism:

If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the [white] wall [of signification], distributed by the [black] hole [of subjectivity]. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man's claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an "other." Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it's a Jew, it's an Arab, it's a Negro, it's a lunatic . . .). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be.⁵

For Anjuna's psy-trance parties, there were "no people on the outside." Locals, domestic tourists, charter tourists, and beggars would join the white Goa freaks on the dance floor, sometimes even in Nine Bar. In fact, as with the United Colors of Benetton, it will be remembered that the rhetoric of PLUR demonstrated faciality's *inclusiveness*—the parties were supposed to be open to all. But immediately, the faciality machine would place all bodies in relation to the Goa freak standard, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, measuring their acceptability through increasingly meticulous signs: sociochemical monitoring, scene savviness, chillum circles, sexual attractiveness. Many nonfreaks felt uneasy being pigeonholed like this—especially domestic tourists, who would retreat to the darker corners. The result was viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable—*more or less*.

It would seem to me that to understand the intricate hierarchies of racism, a framework that allows for *gradual* and multidimensional deviances is preferable to a dialectical model. Faciality also explains why after colonialism, with television and tourism, there is scarcely place left for any "dark others." Everyone is included; everyone is facialized. At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and White Man

(Elvis Presley, Sylvester Stallone, David Beckham) remains the global standard against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm, even in our “post”-colonial era. Where it differs, however, is that deviance is based not on lack of recognition or negation or annihilation of the other, but on subtle machinic differentiations and territorializations. The virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a); they continually differentiate as actual bodies interact and aggregate. Racism, then, can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.

The Fact of Whiteness

What Deleuze and Guattari make plain in a different way than Fanon is that to understand racism, one has to understand whiteness. As the field of white studies demonstrates, the white racial formation has since the Renaissance succeeded in arranging all others “around” it in its efforts to control the globe. A lot of white studies shows how whiteness in media representations is both implicit and dependent on a negation of “coloredness.”⁶ Toni Morrison argues that the white American notions of freedom and progress are imagined through the systematic denial of the presence of African bodies: “Whiteness, alone, is mute, meaningless, unfathomable, pointless, frozen, veiled, curtained, dreaded, senseless, implacable.”⁷ What is also peculiar about the materiality of whiteness is that it posits itself as a transcendent category. Whites simultaneously refuse to think of themselves as raced or colored (they are above race) *and* continually reinvent themselves, escape their own corporeality (they are beyond race). This just may have something to do with Christian theology:

Concepts of race are concepts of different kinds of bodies. What makes whites different, and at times uneasily locatable in terms of race, is their embodiment, their closeness to the pure spirit that was made flesh in Jesus, their spirit of mastery over their and other bodies, in short their potential to transcend their raced bodies.⁸

But although it’s true that whiteness gains its power from being invisible as a racial formation, the analysis should not stop here. In a sense this leaves whiteness as something in itself empty and ungraspable and leads to the problems identified with the formalism of post-Hegelian antiessentialism. That whiteness is central to contemporary race relations is a geo-historical accomplishment, not a question of formal logic in the uncon-

scious. Even the literature on faciality tends not to analyze the positive and properly machinic workings of whiteness. Through slavery, cartography, guns, urban morphology, the regulation of reproduction, cultural representations and new circulations of nonhuman life (viruses, rats), Europeans profoundly altered the face of the global racial assemblage.⁹ They deepened race's virtuality. It seems that whiteness is race's most energetic instantiation—even though, of course, much of its material and imaginative energies were tapped from other racial formations.

Seen through a Deleuzian–Guattarian framework, whiteness is a force whose strength, as I said about race in general, lies in its concurrent implicitness and plasticity. If for Fanon the fact of blackness lay in the impossibility, imposed by whites, of blacks defining themselves, what can be called “the fact of whiteness” is that whites *continually overcome themselves*: becoming spirit, exploring, becoming richer and smarter than one's parents, conquering the world and one's body, going native, psychedelic transformations of self. Seemingly more than any other racial formation (even the warrior and shamanic tribes that Deleuze and Guattari cite as the heroes of deterritorialization), the white racial formation is defined by movement, by its urge to become different—especially during the period called modernity. Except for Leslie Fiedler, few commentators have taken this creative if parasitic fact of whiteness seriously. Of course, this does not deny other cultures and formations their creativity; it only stresses the unprecedented range and industriousness of white self-transformation. The great viscosities of capitalism, colonialism, and White Man emerged out of the many tiny desires to escape the viscosity that tied white bodies to their birthplace and traditional identity.

In short, whites became dominant not simply by constructing an unbridgeable divide between white and nonwhite, as, for example, Edward Said would have it. It is crucial that the point I'm making is not taken as Eurocentric self-aggrandizement in the face of postcolonial theory. What I want to argue is, I hope, uncontroversial: that whites have been squarely in the business of producing and rearranging racial difference, whether it was through relatively benign exoticism and adventurous anthropology or state-sponsored genocide and apartheid laws. Marie Louise Pratt points out that it was certain white bodies who dominated this exercise—influential urban men.¹⁰ But these explorers, generals, merchants, and missionaries were the vanguard of a subsequent globalizing whiteness. The fact of whiteness to a very large extent determined the shape of today's globalization, and most of globalization's injustices cannot be examined separately from it.

Freaking Whiteness

“In no real sense did the hippies become Indians or poor blacks, or prostitutes or tramps—or only in a guilty disingenuous sense—but they found their own significance in what they took these groups to be: a significance to be understood against the dominant society and with respect to their own special awareness,” says the ethnographer Paul Willis.¹¹ Seeing blacks, Mexicans, and Indians as more authentic, because relatively untouched by mainstream white modernity, the counterculture transformed white modernity by appropriating some of that authenticity. But it is that very appropriation that betrays white privilege and that spawns new tropes of subcultural (and potentially racist) snobbism. A creative movement turning in on itself, becoming paranoid and reactionary, is what Guattari called “microfascism.” Psychedelics clearly turned microfascistic in Anjuna, accompanied as it was by arrogance, segregation, noise pollution, corruption, exploitation, and psychosis. If whiteness is defined by its lines of flight, microfascism becomes as interesting to the study of whiteness as Nazism. Psychedelics—travel, music, drugs—is whiteness accelerating, whiteness stuttering: either a deeper entrenchment into economic and cultural exploitation, or a shedding of privilege, at least here and now.

On the whole, the Goa freaks of Anjuna do not follow the lines of flight of whiteness to critique their own position as whites. In this sense, they were hardly “freaking” the racial assemblage. Recall the proposition of Rachel Adams and Leslie Fiedler of appropriating *freak* as a critical category:

[F]reaks cannot be neatly aligned with any particular identity or ideological position. Rather, *freak* is typically used to connote the absence of any known category of identity. . . . I am drawn to *freak* because, like *queer*, it is a concept that refuses the logic of identity politics, and the irreconcilable problems of inclusion and exclusion that necessarily accompany identity categories.¹²

A true freaking of whiteness would grasp its lines of flight not for fascism but for a future where paler-skinned bodies have no privileged access to economic and cultural capital and to happiness. Freaking whiteness is problem-based, coalition-led, and self-critical; it would try to understand what biophysical and technological forces subtend it (computers, HIV, floods, radiation). Humanism and cosmopolitanism are severely limited if the struggle against racism is defined only in human terms.

So: race should not be abandoned or abolished, but *proliferated*. Race's energies are then directed at multiplying racial differences, so as to render them joyfully cacophonous. What is needed is an affirmation of race's virtuality. When racial formations crumble and mingle like this, the dominance of whiteness in the global racial assemblage is undermined as the faciality machine finds it increasingly difficult to take hold of bodies. It is not that everyone becomes completely Brownian (or brown!), completely similar, or completely unique. It is just that white supremacy slowly becomes obsolete as other racial formations start harboring the same creativity as whites do now, linking all sorts of phenotypes with all sorts of wealth and all sorts of ways of life (sedentary, touristic, ascetic). When no racial formation is the standard, *race* acquires a very different meaning:

The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers; there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no dominant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race.¹³

When no racial formation is clearly hegemonic, perhaps there will be no need anymore for the term "race." Although there will always be phenotypical variation and relations of power, perhaps sometime in the future they won't be correlated at all. Unlikely, but possible. Until then, however, there seems little point in trying to stop talking about race, as anti-racists such as Paul Gilroy suggest we do.¹⁴ Race is creative, and we can heed its creativities against itself.

Challenging the global faciality machine encompasses the transformation not just of prejudice, tabloid journalism, and Unesco, but of the pharmaceutical industry, farm subsidies, seismology, the arms trade, income tax policy, and the International Monetary Fund. In contrast to what many anti-racists and advocates of political correctness prescribe, the sites where the most urgent battles are to be fought are not culture and language, but trade and health. Freaking whiteness is no easy task. A good start for social scientists, however, is to acknowledge the persistent materiality of race. It is important that the real barriers to mobility and imagination that exist in different places be taken into account. Cosmopolitanism has to be invented, not imposed. Taking responsibility and activism will only follow from both understanding and feeling the intensive differences that exist between many different kinds of bodies: between a Jew and a black soldier, between a woman in the Sahel and a woman on Wall Street, between a Peruvian peasant and a Chinese journalist.

Strategies for Anjuna

In research from a materialist point of view, there can be no separating politics and ethics from ontology and science. A short article of mine on the Goa trance scene in the *Unesco Courier* of July/August 2000 reached a wide range of tourism and youth activists. A German NGO and an Israeli antidrugs officer contacted me for more information. I sent the dissertation on which this book is based to Panjim's Central Library and NGOs such as Goa Desc and Goa Foundation, from where it made its way to some Goan journalists and a number of interested academics and psychancers. My research was never just representation but itself a (small) component in Anjuna's machinic assemblage. I was a bit nervous, for example, about my Friday Balcão seminar in Mapusa, just a few miles from Anjuna, and asked Goa Desc not to publish my first name in the local newspapers. A materialist ethnography accepts that it will have some material effects and tries to foreshadow them. If the suggestions below seem somewhat unabashed, this is because I was necessarily very much involved in what I was studying.

The multiplication of race I'm proposing should be distinguished from other antiracist strategies. It is neither antiwhite, nor pro-Indian, nor a simple celebration of hybridity, nor multicultural or universalist. Machinic antiracism isn't antiwhite because it is aware that the freaky creativities of the white racial formation can be used against white supremacy. It doesn't take sides in racial politics at all (for Indians, for minorities, for the poor, against the rich) but asks what needs to happen for there to be sides at all. Machinism is wary of any identity politics as this tends to hide internal fissures of the identity it seeks to defend. In my case, the resistance against cultural imperialism in defense of some Goan identity has often been severely limited by a strong Catholic, nostalgic and middle-class bias, as well as homophobia and conservative moralism.¹⁵ Machinism also avoids the easy reverence for travel and bricolage found in postmodernism and a lot of cultural studies. Mobility and hybridization can be good or bad. A lack of cosmopolitanism cannot be held against anyone but must be explained. Hailing the transracial inventiveness in consumer tactics hardly erodes the international division of labor, advertising, and the military-industrial complex that support racial clustering in the first place. Finally, machinism does not imply multiculturalism or liberal universalism, because hoping for horizontal equality ("color blindness") and mere tolerance of the other leaves out of analysis the privileged location of whites from which equality and tolerance are bound to be defined. Importantly, though, these common antiracist practices aren't without their relevance. They just need to

be seen as limited in their effectivity and potentially even reinforcing the intricate system of whiteness they want to attack.

Let me expand on these strategic options. The first antiracist strategy I want to take issue with, an unqualified renunciation of whiteness, is found in Goa's antihippie activism, moral panics about the raves, and tough police action. This antithetical stance has demonstrably had no lasting effect, while it prevents critical and informed debate, ensures corruption, and ignores the dependency of locals and seasonal migrants on rave tourism. By 2006 the scene seemed to be all but strangled by the stricter implementation of noise pollution laws. This should be seen not as a victory against imperialism, but as a rash crackdown on an entire tourist economy.

On a more fundamental level, the antithetical stance toward whiteness is hypocritical from the start, as the myth of *Goa dourada* on which it is ultimately based was itself forced onto Goa by a previous invasion of white Christianity (of the Portuguese, including the terrorism of an Inquisition). An obvious first step to do anything about the scene is to do away with all the Catholic moralism and to legalize loud music during the night in designated areas. The scene has to be regulated. It will be then possible to organize raves at regular venues outside the villages (down on Vagator Beach, further inland toward Mapusa, north of Morjim, etc.). Instead of bribes, organizers pay taxes. The rampant competition during the late 1990s among party consortiums, chai mamas, taxi wallahs, vendors at the parties, flea-market merchants, motorbike renters, Internet cafés, beggar gangs, places with pool tables, and so on should be controlled by quota. Of course, the more regulation, the more potential for corruption. But hopefully Goa's strong record in civil action and public debate will continue to bring corruption into the open. And as more middle-class Goan youth participate in the scene, it will appear less of an example of cultural imperialism to the public. The presence of whites on Anjuna's soil is not in itself bad. In fact, the global privilege of whites to sample other places shouldn't be abolished or lamented, but responsibly exploited for generating secure and legitimate income for local populations.

It needs to be clear how tourism affects different groups differently; one can't simply be "pro-Indian." Take Goa's war on drugs. It's perfectly clear that it only benefits corruption and gangsterism, the dupes usually being smaller Indian dealers instead of the big (white) fish. Washington isn't going to allow Delhi any "softer" policy on drugs, but lawyers could court Hindu-chauvinist sentiment into a legalization of cannabis on religious and historical grounds. Doctors and youth workers can lobby for a policy of harm reduction (through flyers) regarding LSD, Ecstasy, ketamine,

and other drugs. This is especially urgent with consumption exploding among rich Indian youth. It is crucial that “the drug menace” is no longer associated with white junkies and a vicious international mafia, as it has been for decades in India. Hopefully, Goans, especially journalists and other intellectuals, will start to understand that even with drug casualties and some local boys dealing, rave tourism is far less detrimental to the landscape and society than the prestige projects pushed by Indian tycoons and purchasable politicians. Anjuna’s families make money directly off rave tourism, and their interests can be transparently represented at government level by unionist lobbying via *panchayats* and MLAs. Multiplying race in Anjuna would start with accepting that tourists (both foreign and domestic) will continue to embark on psychedelic transformations of self. What needs to be thought about is how locals could benefit too.

An example of the second kind of antiracism would be finding and celebrating the hybridizations and cultural parodies that emerge in a contact zone like Goa. White sadhus meditating on the beach, Indian sadhus doing cocaine, Goan Goa freaks, resident hippie elders: it is undeniable that these bodies challenge faciality, pointing toward a potential for freaking whiteness. But hybridity is too often imitation, not invention—the rich Bombay youths trying to act like Goa freaks for a weekend. Moreover, it’s not a question of mixing two initially discrete racial assemblages, one white, one Indian. Whiteness and Indianness are already hybrid and entwined, though faciality drives bodies to one of them. Also, both whiteness and Indianness need to be transformed in the process of freaking. The bodies listed above do little to change the system of visual economy and the politics of location that underpin psychedelic whiteness.

Nonetheless, Anjuna’s abstract machine does consist of many intensive differences and many as yet unknown possibilities. What Anjuna needs to escape faciality are hybrids like white chai mamas, Indian deejay celebs, some Bollywood breaks and house alongside the monotonous psy-trance, locals teaching the in-crowd to dance, freaks visiting Old Goa or *walking* to Big Vagator Beach on a Sunday, charter tourists from Jakarta, Israeli loners, sincere cops, a reggae beach shack run by Kenyans, domestic tourists in Primrose’s veranda, Indians and Britons sharing a house, children from a Rajasthani–French marriage, a Japanese-run rehab clinic, a cheap Caribbean restaurant. These instances of the proliferation of race can hardly be identifiable as part of racial formations. They can be neither predicted nor organized, only hoped for and welcomed when they do occur. Within such a hoped-for constellation it is not that race is transcended, but the racial machine experiments with new combinations that erode the standard white Goa freak face.

The third antiracist strategy is multiculturalism. In Anjuna and Goa trance, PLUR is a naive version of this strategy. The ethnography showed that the face-to-face is more than recognizing different “cultures,” because the question remains, *Who* does the recognizing? Cultures, people cannot exist side by side if some are more dominant than others. As part of a long thread on Israel/Palestine, T. on the 604 psy-trance list voiced skepticism about Goa trance universalism:

You know those magic four letters that lurk in the rave/dance scene? “PLUR”—peace, love, unity, respect? Well, total global peace would leave the human race unable to defend itself. Unconditional all-consuming love would make us incapable of stopping someone no matter how much harm they were causing. As for unity—diversity is required for survival, no variation and we could all be wiped out by some nasty virus or similar. And respect . . . well, isn’t it the people who have lost respect in the status quo who go out and find something new and different?

By positing the self-sufficiency of psychedelic space, PLUR forecloses any politics. “It seems to be a common concept in the trance (and traveller) scene, that enjoying a free, alternative lifestyle can somehow miraculously help people out in Botswana,” wrote D. in the same thread. In any case, if there is any mystical togetherness in Anjuna, it is realized precariously, only in the morning, when there is a manageable minority of Indians. Instead of multiculturalism, there needs to be an acknowledgment of the deep inequalities in mobility and wealth that constitute the scene. Hopefully, the rare face-to-face encounters can accumulate to modestly politicize these inequalities.

As in psy-trance scenes elsewhere in the world, parties in Goa could then be explicitly organized for causes without becoming patronizing or boring. Web sites and guidebooks (it must be said, especially in Hebrew) have to demand elementary politeness toward one’s hosts. Backpackers, charter tourists, and Indian freaks who are irritated with the subcultural snobbery and the denigrating way freaks treat Indians should speak up. Likewise, local boys have to be less shy of openly ridiculing the pretentiousness of freaks and start understanding the virtues of organizing. Freaking whiteness in Anjuna would have to include freaks mingling with other tourists, of course. Given their viscosity, this is pretty difficult, but it could be facilitated by spreading in-crowd shacks along the coast. To attract all groups well before morning at parties, light shows, performances, and top deejays can start already after sunset. In any case, the pointless morning phase segregation must be avoided. There’s no rationale for keeping chai mamas and their kids and an entire village awake throughout

the night for the snobbery of a minority. True, when I last visited Anjuna in 2005–6, the morning phase was peopled by as many domestic tourists as white freaks. This was not, however, accompanied by any new recognition of Anjuna’s power-geometries.

Party consortiums and the in-crowd will have to come to terms with how self-destructive the scene has become, while hippie elders’ authoritative opinions about the myopic greed of party consortiums need to be taken into account. Maybe Goa Gil and Eight-Fingered Eddy could publish their stories on much-visited Web sites such as the Psychedelic Chaishop (www.chaishop.com). The near-permanent party ban demonstrates that the only way to save the scene is to regulate it. If negotiation and exposure are deemed to threaten Anjuna’s “authenticity,” it should be asked how authentic the present state of affairs is. Regulation would need to follow from efforts at cooperation between the various groups involved in the political economy of the parties. The Anjunkars will play a crucial role between officials, party consortiums and the press. However, they will need to be organized first—a meeting between *panchayat*, local boys, venue owners, chai mamas, clergy, antiparty residents, and representatives of seasonal immigrants is bound to be a refreshingly novel event for all.

My hopes for a reorganization of race may seem utopian, open-ended, or anarchistic. Machinism is pragmatic and empirical, however. Perhaps unlike what Deleuze and Guattari would wish for, I think that ending racism will have to include state intervention, as well as statistical surveys, unionization, urban planning, and social critique. Perhaps the indications just outlined of what a pragmatic politics and ethics against racism could consist of in Anjuna will make the project of freaking whiteness look a little more concrete. The creative materiality of race means that it cannot be deliberately abolished. Antiwhite moralism, identity politics, hybridization, and multiculturalism are political strategies not irrelevant, but insufficient to breed the multiplication of racial formations. Never has there been any proper attempt to rearrange Anjuna’s racial assemblage; it has, traditionally, been left to teem into more and more microfascism and faciality. The critical question now is how to *make* it teem, how really to freak it out—how to prevent it from repeating the same old habits of white modernity.

I have now fleshed out the theoretical and political conclusions to be drawn from a materialist ethnography of rave tourism in Goa. Race emerges corporeally, machinically, and ecologically, amid the interactions of bodies in the cultural, economic, and artifactual environment of Anjuna. Race can therefore be reconceptualized ontologically as a machinic assemblage. This take on race differs from the dominant social-constructionist

race concept in that it does not disavow the materiality of race, but places it at the heart of theorization. Building on an emergentist and pluralist conception of difference, I want to emphasize the creativity of race, particularly of whiteness. Combating racism thus needs to grasp not just the rigid boundaries and contradictions, but the virtual realm of race by virtue of which it continually rearranges itself. Treating race as social construction alone directs politics away from what can be done to prevent racial subordination on scales from the Goan village to the deeply unjust planet.

Notes

ethnography as thought

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1. Psychedelic Whiteness

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3. Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks*, 109–40.
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5. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 178.
6. For example, Dyer, *White*.
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11. Willis, *Profane Culture*, 93.
12. Adams, *Sideshow U.S.A.*, 10.
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the molecular revolution

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