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TRACES OF HISTORY

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Elementary Structures of Race

that, once exploited people outlive their utility, settler societies can fall back on the repertoire of strategies (in this case, spatial sequestration) whereby they have dealt with the Native (in the European case, Jewish) surplus. The reverse also applies: in the frontier era, as we have seen, Native removal was conducted on the basis of an incorrigibility that Whites ascribed to Indians with all the fixity of the traits they also ascribed to Blacks. Again, therefore, race is not merely a social construct. In constantly requiring re-construction, its incompleteness becomes exposed and vulnerable to complex and versatile solidarities that refuse the strategic divisions that race would impose. Anti-racist solidarities need to conjoin as wide a range of historical relationships as colonialism itself has created.

Race's incompleteness reflects the jurisdictional patchworks whereby, within settler states, sovereignties remain contested and unevenly distributed. In Australia, the current 'intervention' separates out Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory for a kind of medium-intensity martial law, while, at a lower level of intensity, Native Title legislation discriminates between the proprietorial—and, accordingly, sovereign—capacities of Aboriginal societies. In the United States, the vagaries of registration and tribal enrolment provide for a plethora of differential statuses.

Such differences are not static. They represent balances, relative standings in continuing contestations over colonial domination. In addition to its manifest spatiality, invasion is intrinsically historical, being conducted in ever-shifting counterpoint to its reflex and constant companion, resistance. New England is more completely invaded than New Mexico. The Northern Territory is less completely invaded—less complacently held—than Melbourne. The same holds, only more visibly, for Gaza and Tel Aviv. Moreover, as observed, it holds across time as well as space. The Northern Territory is less securely invaded today, it would seem, than it was ten years ago; Gaza certainly so. Nowadays, Indigenous peoples in Australia themselves determine the make-up of their communities, while parts of the Coranderrk woods are once again in Wurundjeri hands. These are important advances. The incompleteness of racial domination is the trace and the achievement of resistance, a space of hope.

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knowledgeable majority. In this perhaps surprising correspondence, colonialism's classificatory workings emerge with particular clarity—as, I hope, do some of the directions we can take to rid our world of the historical iniquities of race, which is the hope on which this book concludes.

Conclusion

The Unfinished Business of Race

It is not my place to instruct colonised people on how to resist their condition, let alone to impersonate their agency. In this book, I have tried to offer an analysis, in the hope that it may prove useful. A conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that race, being historically contingent, can be overcome.

Race is not here to stay. As we have seen, it had a beginning—different beginnings, in different times and places—and it requires constant ideological maintenance. Rather than dissolving away, Native populations in Australia, Brazil and the United States have grown dramatically as people refuse assimilation and collectively assert Indigenous subjectivities. A strategic response to this assertiveness has been multiculturalism, whereby settler states have sought to depoliticise Indigenous difference by reducing it to the detoxified arena of cultural variety, a sovereignty-free zone. This more recent development ranks with historical shifts that we have noted, as colonialism has adjusted to apparent compromises such as emancipation, tribal recognition or Native citizenship.

Race is versatile, fluid and opportunistic. Thus we should not link particular modes of racialisation to particular human groups in perpetuity, a perspective that recapitulates race's own essentialism. As both Arab-Jews and African Brazilians have found, the same group can be excluded under

some circumstances and included or assimilated under others, with the end—colonial domination—remaining constant all the while. Accordingly, when Whites were in a minority, Blackness became distinctly mutable in Georgia and South Carolina. On emancipation, moreover, Black people in the USA became surplus to some requirements and, to that extent, more like Indians. Thus it is highly significant that the barbarities of Jim Crow should be post-emancipation phenomena. As valuable commodities, slaves had only been destroyed *in extremis*. Today in the USA, the blatant racial zoning of the penal system and large industrial cities—where the commonality with the Jewish experience finds expression in the term 'ghetto'—suggests

Introduction

Teaching Aboriginal History at an Australian university brought me into unexpected contact with race politics in the United States. A disproportionate number of my students were from the USA, exchange students looking for something they could not study at their home universities. When asked what sparked their interest in the history of Aboriginal peoples' experience of White Australia, these students were almost unanimous:

'I've studied race issues back home, from slavery to civil rights, and I'd like to know how Black people have fared in Australia.'

'Well,' I would respond, 'Aboriginal people here are indeed called "Black", only they're Indigenous. Their ancestors weren't bought and sold in slave markets. They were dispossessed. Indians are Aboriginal people's closest counterparts in the United States, not Black people.'

With few exceptions, this reply would elicit surprise, or sometimes a polite indifference. Some students, by no means only African American ones, would respond: 'Maybe; but for me race is about colour. That's what leads to discrimination. When you say "colored" in the United States, you generally mean Black. That's why I'm interested in the Aborigines. They're Black, too.'

The few Aboriginal students tended not to reciprocate this sentiment. They generally took well to the US students, but without selecting for colour. They simply preferred them to the White Australians, whose innocence was all too familiar. Mention Native Americans, however, and the response of Aboriginal students was immediate and positive, as it was to the mention of Maoris, Palestinians, Sami, West Papuans or Native Hawaiians. In each case, Aboriginal students responded with a confidence they rarely displayed within the White university, a confidence that declared them to be speaking of their own. The community these students shared with other Indigenous people is deeper than colour, and more specific than discrimination. It is a

common history: one of invasion, of loss of land, of elimination, of resistance, of survival and the hazards of renaissance. The role that colonialism has assigned to Indigenous people is to disappear. By contrast, though slavery meant the giving up of Africa, Black Americans were primarily colonised for their labour rather than for their land. These basic historical differences live on in settler popular culture, where representations of Black Australians and Red Americans distinctly resemble each other, while each contrasts sharply with representations of Black Americans. While Aboriginal people are called Black, for instance, they are not popularly credited with the natural sense of rhythm that still signifies fitness for labour on the part of those whose ancestors were enslaved. Conversely, unlike Aborigines, Black Americans have not been routinely stereotyped as a dying race. This convenient condition has instead been assigned to Native Americans.

Racialised distinctions such as these bespeak different histories, of different forms of expropriation—in one case of labour, in another of land. Moreover, such differences are site-specific. Whereas the enslavement of Africans in the United States produced the most rigorously polarised regime of race, the enslavement of Africans in Brazil produced a variegated continuum of colour classifications. To recuperate the distinct histories that fall together under the common heading of ‘race’, this book will trace some of the ways in which regimes of race have reflected and reproduced different forms of colonialism. Race, I shall argue, is a trace of history: colonised populations continue to be racialised in specific ways that mark out and reproduce the unequal relationships into which Europeans have co-opted these populations. This argument will be exemplified with reference to the diversity distinguishing racial discourses obtaining in Australia, the USA, Brazil, central Europe, and Palestine/Israel.

The chapters to come will explore a range of racial constructs, each instantiating a particular colonial relationship: in Australia and in the USA, White authorities have generally accepted—even targeted—Indigenous people’s physical substance, synecdochically represented as ‘blood’, for assimilation into their own stock. When it has come to African American people’s physical substance, however, it has only been in the past few decades that US authorities have dispensed with the most rigorously exclusionary procedures for insulating the dominant stock, the ‘one-drop rule’ having assigned a hyperpotency to African heredity that recalls the ineradicability of Jewishness in European antisemitism. By contrast, Brazil’s policy of ‘racial democ-

the changing ways in which they have sought to maintain it. The opening two chapters will compare the different racialisations of two peoples who are both called Black: Indigenous people in Australia and African Americans in the USA. As already indicated, the regimes of race that Europeans have sought to impose on these two populations have been practically antithetical. Black people in Australia have been subjected to a set of inclusive discourses intended to bring about their assimilation into White Australian society, while Black people in the USA have been subjected to a rigidly exclusive regime whose ostensible object has been the preservation of White racial purity.

In chapters three and four, which complete the first half of the book, it will be seen that, in some significant regards, the racialisation of Jews in post-emancipation central Europe resembles the racialisation of Black people in the USA, especially in the post-emancipation era, while the racialisation of both Black people and Indians in Brazil will emerge as distinctly different from the racialisation of Black people in either Australia or the USA. In all these cases, the particular regimes of race that have been imposed on the populations concerned reflect and reproduce the manner of their incorporation into European social systems. Moreover, as will emerge, a feature common to all these situations is a complex interplay between discourses of assimilation and of exclusion, the local outcomes of this interplay being varied and mobile.

With much of the conceptual groundwork by this stage established, the four chapters in the second half of the book focus on the interplay between assimilation and exclusion, presenting more extensive case studies from two settler colonies, the USA and Palestine/Israel. In different but related ways, and under different but related circumstances, US and Israeli authorities have both coordinated discourses of assimilation and exclusion as foundational components in the ongoing process of settler-state formation. We will consider these two case studies in turn, situating and historically analysing the racialisation of Indigenous people in the USA and that of Arab-Jews in Palestine/Israel.

As will be shown, while the racialisation of Indians in the USA evinces profound similarities to that of Indigenous Australians, similarities that reflect their also sharing the historical predicament of settler invasion, the racialisation (or non-racialisation) of Arab-Jews in Israel/Palestine bears distinct similarities to that of African Brazilians, who are also part of an unac-

in themselves. Rather, colonial authorities' attempts to police racial categories are significant for the light they cast on that which they seek to protect.

Nonetheless, in addition to revealing the historical contingency of regimes of race, and tracing the different forms of colonial coercion that they respectively encode, a focus on miscegenation discourse underscores the profoundly gendered fact that, along with immigration (though more constantly across time), women's bodies are the key site for the reproduction of colonialism's unequally related populations. 'From our point of view,' as Eduardo de Oliveira e Oliveira observed of the Brazilian context—in which, as we shall see, miscegenation has been claimed to testify to a relatively benign form of slavery—'the Portuguese tendency to miscegenation does not necessarily indicate tolerance, much more the reverse: miscegenation necessarily indicates an extreme form of exploitation and degradation of the Black woman.'

This book is about the systemic logics in which that exploitation participates. As we shall see through the examples to come, colonialism presumes to prescribe whether the child a woman bears in her womb becomes one of her own people or one of her oppressors.

Thus the key factor in colonial and 'post'-colonial race relations is not, as some once argued, simple demographic numbers, since populations have to be differentiated before they can be counted. Difference, it cannot be stressed enough, is not simply given. It is the outcome of differentiation, which is an intensely conflictual process. If a one-drop rule applied in Australia, for instance, the Aboriginal population would escalate overnight. Hence the incendiary effect of a Queensland bumper sticker, the display of which was truly for none but the brave, which proclaimed an 'Aboriginal family reunion—invite your white relatives.' Rather than simple counting, demography involves the most complex and tortuous contestation, as in Virginian Natives' century-long struggle to refuse categorisation as 'colored', a struggle that was waged, as Jack Forbes remarked, 'with uneven success and ... which served to poison African-American/Indian relations as well as to split communities, churches, and even families.' Miscegenation discourse is about holding the line when it comes to power, privilege, and access to resources. As such, it is at the material core of identity politics, which culminate and reproduce colonial subordination into the present.

On this basis, in the hope of contributing to anti-racist solidarities, this book will explore a range of racial regimes with a view to highlighting both the foundations on which Europeans have established racial supremacy and

racy' has sought to whiten the African Brazilian population by means of a combination of White immigration and officially sanctioned miscegenation intended to lighten the prevailing phenotype. Strategically, Brazil's project of deracinating lower-order African Brazilians with a view to constructing a uniformly European nation resembles Israel's project of deracinating lower-order Arab-Jews with a view to constructing a uniformly Jewish nation. In these last two cases, as we shall see, race works through *de*-racination.

There are no grounds for assuming that such striking disparities represent the uniform workings of a discursive monolith called 'race'. Rather, this book will stress the diversity distinguishing the regimes of difference with which colonisers have sought to manage subject populations. These distinctions are very important. They entail different, and not always harmonious, strategies of anticolonial resistance. For instance, when Black people in the USA campaigned for equal rights in the mid-twentieth century, much of their political programme centred on the demand that they be treated equally with Whites. At the same time, however, treating Indians the same as Whites—which is to say, assimilating them into mainstream society—was a settler-colonial strategy that the Native American political movement, in common with the Aboriginal political movement in Australia, was striving to resist. The mathematics of the head-count is inimical to Native sovereignty. A focus on colour (or non-Whiteness) obscures such historically produced differences—in this case, between a history of bodily exploitation and one of territorial dispossession. A relationship premised on the exploitation of enslaved labour requires the continual reproduction of its human providers. By contrast, a relationship premised on the evacuation of Native people's territory requires that the peoples who originally occupied it should never be allowed back.

A mutuality between these otherwise antithetical relationships was sealed in the White man's discourse of property. As John Locke provided, in texts that would profoundly influence Euroamerican colonial ideology, private property accrued from the admixture of labour and land. As this formula was colour-coded on the colonial ground, Blacks provided the former and Indians the latter, the application of Black people's labour to Red people's land producing the White man's property—a primitive accumulation if ever there was one. The two societies, Native and enslaved, were of antithetical but complementary value to White society. Whereas Black people were valuable commodities, Indians obstructed the expansion of settlement.

Though juridically excluded, therefore, enslaved people were demographically fostered, to the extent that their numbers continued to grow even after slave imports into the USA were finally halted in 1808. In the Indian case, by contrast, no effort was spared to eliminate them, in ways that have varied according to context. The expansion and consolidation of US settler society conjoined and depended on both these historical relationships, along with others. To be effective, anti-racist solidarities should conjoin as wide a range of historical relationships as colonialism itself has created.

Traces of History

In the sound-bite vocabulary of race, the three points of Eric Williams's Atlantic triangle, Africa, America, and Europe, became embodied as Black, Red, and White: a chromatic taxonomy that continues to register the historical relationships that gave rise to it. Thus it is no accident that the most durable names that have been applied to the two colonised populations, Black (or Negro) and Indian, refer to a bodily characteristic and a territorial designation respectively. Racially, Black people's value as labour was registered in a regime whereby no amount of amalgamation (miscegenation, as it came to be called after the Civil War) would affect a person's status as a slave—and, in its fully racialised post-emancipation form, as a Black person.

The founding logic of this calculus is brutally obvious: it maximised the reproduction of slaves. As such, it contrasts with the logic informing the racialisation of Indians, whereby—as in the case of Indigenous people in Australia—non-White blood figured as highly unstable rather than as inexhaustibly resistant to admixture. In both the USA and Australia, White blood has been credited with a cuckoo-like capacity to breed Nativeness out, a biogenetic extension of frontier homicide that contrasts diametrically with the one-drop rule that applied to the formerly enslaved. In the contemporary USA, blood quantum regulations, which exclude Indians with non-Indian ancestry from tribal reckoning, constitute a post-frontier analogue to the Vanishing Indian. In Australia, light skin has rendered Aboriginal children liable to official abduction into White society.

Thus there is nothing stable or essential about being Black, since Black people in Australia were targeted for biocultural elimination in a manner antithetical to the racial targeting of Black people in the USA. On the other hand, as will be shown in more detail below, Indigenous people in both

of differences—colours, races, minorities, ethnicities—on a multicultural canvas that levels the varied histories that produced these differences in the first place. Historically analysed, these apparent conflicts of sectional interest emerge as traces of the complementary roles into which different conquered populations have been coerced by colonial settlers.

These distinct modes of coercion together subtend the overarching system of Euroamerican colonialism, so solidarities should be framed at this more encompassing level. Solidarity is not assimilation. To conjoin is not to dissolve. To work together, differences have to be integrated rather than levelled. Correspondingly, the promotion of racialised identities from below does not necessarily further the interests of the colonised. When insurgent classifications misguidedly seek to promote unworkable solidarities through obfuscating or homogenising away the different historical experiences that underlie ethno-racial specificity, they recapitulate assimilationism (which, after all, is an erasure of difference). Understandable though its motivation is, therefore—and quite apart from its questionable reliance on phenotype—the 'people of colour' classification can risk incurring this problem. Whatever their motivations, when inattentive to history, undifferentiated categories risk encouraging discord rather than solidarity. Paradoxical as it may seem, to homogenise is to divide—which leaves White people doing the ruling.

In stressing the different historical experiences that underlie particular regimes of race at the same time as it stresses their systemic complementarity, this book seeks to make a contribution to the struggle against race and the colonial relations of inequality that it sustains. In order for something to be resisted, it must first be understood. To this end, we will approach differentiation by way of its negation, focusing on the points at which racial classifications most conspicuously come undone.

For such classifications, in common with other cultural boundaries, operate most visibly where they are vulnerable, at the points where the divisions that they proclaim break down. In the case of emancipated Jews in central Europe, as we shall see, their difference from Gentile society was so tenuous that they were condemned for their similarity—being charged, in bourgeois society, with the possession of bourgeois traits. In some of the other cases that we shall consider, racial boundaries have been so ubiquitously transgressed by sexuality that a cross-cultural survey of discourses of miscegenation provides a way to approach systems of colonial domination comparatively. In these cases, the object of concern is not, therefore, sexual relations

On this basis, when it comes to the racialisation of any particular social group, the following analysis will be twofold: on the one hand, it will trace the shifting contested ways in which a particular group becomes racialised after its initial co-optation by Europeans, noting the continuities and the differences in the forms that its racialisation (or would-be racialisation) subsequently takes over time; on the other hand, it will delineate the particular contribution that the racialisation of any one group has made to the overall maintenance of the colonial system, with particular reference to the ways in which the specific racialisations applied to different groups are coordinated at the level of the whole.

The approach is, therefore, avowedly historical, tracing racial regimes forwards in time from conquered groups' initial co-optation into the colonial system while also making the earlier, preaccumulated histories that Natives and Europeans respectively brought to their initial confrontation an important part of the analysis. For example, as observed, there are considerable differences between the racialisation (or, as we shall see, non-racialisation) of people descended from Africans enslaved in Brazil and the racialisation of people descended from Africans enslaved in North America. A major factor in this difference, or so I shall argue, is the fact that, when Portugal embarked on its career of transatlantic slavery, it was already a maritime empire with characteristics that were quite different from British imperialism, and these differences fed through into the different racial regimes that have been imposed and contested in the two countries ever since. Race is not a static ontology. As its name suggests, it is an ongoing, ever-shifting contest.

Complex Solidarities

A major implication for anti-racist collaboration is the need to recognise the shared provenance of such differences in the White man's imposition of the colonial rule of private property. Yes, some Indians were involved in Black slavery, and, yes, some Blacks participated in Indian dispossession, but neither Indians nor Blacks were the originators and collective beneficiaries of these systemic crimes. Rather, both were caught up in a system that had been created and was being maintained by others. As we shall note in a number of contexts, the outcomes of colonialism cannot be reduced to voluntarism. The liberal discomfort occasioned by the occurrence of tensions between Indians and Blacks reflects a universalism that takes for granted a pastiche

countries, whether classified Red or Black, have been racialised in remarkably similar ways. What matters, then, is not phenotypical endowment. It is not as if social processes come to operate on a naturally present set of bodily attributes that are already given prior to history. Rather, racial identities are constructed in and through the very process of their enactment. In other words, just as, for Durkheim, religion was society speaking, so, I shall argue, race is colonialism speaking, in idioms whose diversity reflects the variety of unequal relationships into which Europeans have co-opted conquered populations.

Given the variety of historical experiences that underlie different regimes of race, a plural formula might be more rigorous, if less felicitous: races are traces of histories. As Matthew Jacobson and others have shown, the demographic hothouse that was US society in the expansive nineteenth century engendered classificatory convolutions as White authorities strove to preserve Anglo-Protestant hegemony in the face of the ever-shifting balance of populations deriving from large-scale immigration. At various stages, the boundaries of Whiteness were stretched to accommodate 'Hindus', and even—despite the steady exclusion of the Chinese—some Japanese (though not, of course, for long). According to David Roediger and Noel Ignatiev, those particularly unlikely Blacks, the Irish, were rendered White sometime around the middle of the nineteenth century. Correspondingly, in the wake of slave emancipation (state by state in the North), the exclusion of Black ancestry was intensified, the racial category 'mulatto' being abandoned along with the juridical category 'free Black'.

By contrast, in the Native case, the end of the US frontier ushered in a new mode of programmatic whitening in the form of the blood quantum regime that initially attended the Dawes-era allotting of reservation land. Comparably, across generations, Aboriginal children in Australia were stolen for Whiteness, while, in Palestine/Israel, in the wake of the 1948 Nakba, Mizrahi Jews, some of them Palestinian, were obliged to relinquish their Arabness and become second-class Jews, rendering the residual 'Arab' population—Palestinians—a minority. In view of this diversity, it is apparent that, useful though it may once have been for denaturalising race, the well-worn piety that race is a social construct does not get us very far. Rather than a conclusion, this general premise founds a set of questions: how are races constructed, under what circumstances, and in whose interests? This book addresses these questions.

As the foregoing illustrates, racial constructs emerge at different times as well as in different places. Thus it is reasonable to question the grounds for treating these multifarious differentiating practices under the one rubric. In view of their heterogeneity, do they share enough in common to be grouped together under the collective heading of 'race', in the singular? A reference shared by each of these varied constructs, a common language in which they are all couched, is ideological: the distinctive notion of race that emerged in Enlightenment discourse on both sides of the north Atlantic in the second half of the eighteenth century. This is not to suggest that Europeans failed to recognise and act on observable phenotypical differences until the 1780s. Precursors, 'blackamores' and their ilk, are legion. Nor is it to pretend that an overland journey from, say, Botswana to Finland would fail to disclose a significant degree of anatomico-geographical correlation. The point is, rather, that the mere fact that people have differentiated between human collectivities does not mean that they have been imbued with the discursive formation that today we call 'race'.

Indeed, the unexamined assumption that other forms of collective differentiation necessarily presuppose racial thinking is a prime example of the ideological process whereby race has been naturalised in Western culture. European xenophobic traditions such as Judaeophobia, Islamophobia or Negrophobia are considerably older than race. Though most if not all of its ingredients can be found in earlier classifications, race itself is a distinctive configuration of ideological elements that we do not find configured in this way before the late eighteenth century, but that we do find so configured, and mutually reinforcing, from that time on. Moreover, this configuration is a specifically European (or Eurocolonial) invention. While other societies have invaded, colonised, and settled—albeit on a smaller scale than Europe—the discourse of race is a distinctly European phenomenon, one among any number of cultural typologies—that we may term xenologies—for differentiating between human collectivities. Accordingly, interesting though comparative information relating to non-European colonial discourses would be, this book confines itself to European (extending to Western) colonialism.

As it emerges in the late eighteenth century, race is a classificatory concept with two general characteristics. First, it is hierarchical. Difference is not neutral: to vary is to be defective, in concert with the degree of variation al-

Queensland sugar plantations, where they were transported—and appropriately re-racialised—so that settlers could avoid reliance on local Aboriginal people. Analogously, Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, founder of New Orleans, advised the French crown to exchange local Natives for Africans enslaved on Caribbean plantations, his reason being that, while the Indians could hardly run away from the islands, once the Africans had arrived in Louisiana their propensity to escape would be countered by fear of the surrounding Indians. The capacity or incapacity for colonial labour is site-specific.

Ubiquitously, therefore, settlers bring their labour with them, usually already coerced, whether as slaves, convicts, indenturees, *Mizrahim*, or other subordinated categories (in some times and places, being Irish would do). The upshot is a plurality that reflects imperialism's global interconnectedness, the goal of settler dominion being pursued by means of a protean range of suppressive and divisive strategies that are typically framed in the idiom of race. Given its intimate anatomical moorings, race is a particularly powerful way to encourage discord between subjugated populations. Again, therefore, at the same time as stressing the differences that regimes of race engender, it is crucial to stress their complementarity, the mutuality with which they together sustain the common end of colonial domination.

We have already noted the tension between African American and Native American orientations to the US civil rights movement. As observed, that tension reflected, as it continues to reflect, the respective historical experiences of chattel slavery and territorial dispossession. Yet the mutuality between the two is complete. As Ronald Takaki needed no more than a sentence to explain: 'In order to make way for White settlement and the expansion of both cotton cultivation and the market, some 70,000 Choctaws, Creeks, Cherokees, Seminoles, and Chickasaws were uprooted and deprived of their lands, and hundreds of thousands of Blacks were moved into the Southwest to work the soil as slaves.'

Analogously, in Hawai'i, the suppression of Kanaka Maoli governance and land tenure was a precondition for the importation of indentured Pacific labourers onto US-owned plantations. That suppression remains directly continuous with current attempts even further to erode Kanaka Maoli entitlement to the Ceded (or, as they are bitterly dubbed, Seized) Lands. Through the combination of two distinct colonial relationships of inequality—applying immigrants' labour to Natives' land—colonial surplus value is generated. Imperialism reconfigures global histories at the local level.

analysis of the emergence of the capitalist ethic in the USA, though without spelling this out: the unmarked means-end optimiser of the capitalist market place was simultaneously the ideal settler-coloniser, *homo assimilians*.

Relations of Invasion

As observed, in concert with the ideological constructions that it gathers together, colonialism is a pre-eminently material set of institutions and practices. Capital and labour from diverse locations converge on the cheap expropriated land that settler invasion makes available. This global elasticity ensures that the local contest is recurrently and ever-augmentably weighted against the Native's finite stock, reinforcing the settler advantage across time. Where regimes of race are concerned, the salient feature of this elasticity is demographic. Considering the emphasis that settlers place on individual diligence, the extent to which they rely on the efforts of others is striking.

When colonists first arrive, they generally try to persuade the Natives to work for them. With the exception of some industries, however (such as Andean mining for the Spanish, Aboriginal labour in the Australian cattle industry, and, of course, sexual servitude), this option is typically abandoned before very long. In principle, it is not good policy to incur reliance on a population that one is simultaneously seeking to eliminate, nor to promote the survival of the bearers of sovereignties that exceed the settler import. In practice, the possibilities for escape are favourable for Natives whose coercion is taking place in the midst of a surrounding network of support systems. Moreover, unlike Africans, whose proximity to Europe meant that they had shared Europe's diseases for centuries, Natives succumbed in large numbers to the exotic pestilences that settlers introduced. For reasons such as these, Natives were generally held unsuitable for colonial labour, duly becoming lazy, dishonest and unreliable in the settler scheme of things.

Significantly, this putative incapacity for work did not actually reside in qualities inherent in Natives themselves. Rather, it was geographic. Natives were deemed unsuitable for work to the extent that they remained in their own country. Move them somewhere else, and they could become good workers on the spot, as in the case of the 'black-birded' Fijians whose stringent exploitation has been recounted by Tracey Banivanua Mar. Disparaged at home as irredeemable cannibals who needed to be replaced by indentured South Asians, these Natives turned out to be well suited for labour on

leged to obtain. Second, it links physical characteristics to cognitive, cultural, and moral ones, encompassing the concrete and the abstract, the animal and the human, the somatic and the semiotic. Thus race is not a negotiable condition but a destiny, one whose principal outward sign is the body. In systematically harnessing social hierarchies to natural essences and recruiting physical characteristics to underwrite the scheme, race constitutes an ideology in the purest of senses.

Historically, the emergence of the ideology of race accords with the shift from mercantilism to an industrial economy, which transformed colonial social organisation in the century following the Enlightenment. Upon industrialisation, the colonial system that had centred on the trading- post gave way to a set of global social relations in which, both at home and abroad, production and consumption were reconstituted to suit the requirements of metropolitan factories. This system, which was much more invasive than mercantilism's trading at the borders, dispensed with the Native middleman and introduced the logic of production into the heart of Native societies, requiring either their removal or their transformation. Disciplinary innovations of the type that we associate with Michel Foucault were integral to this shift.

By comparison, mercantile relationships such as those that had characterised the North American fur trade had been relatively unintrusive. Around the Great Lakes, for instance, in the intercultural middle ground that Richard White has magisterially narrated, with its assorted boundary- straddlers, *coureurs de bois*, mixed marriages, Métis and related hybridities, the fur trade had produced dependency but not—at least, not on a general scale—direct exploitation. Industrialisation cut out the middle ground, taking much of the Native population with it. On this basis, the classificatory shift that Ann Stoler has identified—from generic alterities such as colour and religion that had circulated in early forms of European colonialism, to the consolidation of race as the 'organizing grammar' of the nineteenth-century colonial system—can be seen as key to the increasingly intrusive regimentation that the shift to an industrial economy involved.

To turn to race's thematic content, I wish to propose that what sets race apart from other ideological constructs—and definitively embeds it in the late eighteenth century—is its merger of two central but otherwise distinct elements of Enlightenment discourse. Race reconciled the great taxonomies of natural science with the political rhetoric of the rights of man. The

political optimism infusing the belief in improvement sat awkwardly with the immutable categories of philosophical realism, opposing the hierarchical structuring of natural-scientific classifications to the formal equality that constituted citizenship in liberal-democratic theory. As a taxonomy par excellence, however, race provided categorical boundaries within genus *homo* that ensured the exclusiveness of the bearers of the rights of man.

This Jeffersonian fusion of bourgeois political ideology with classificatory natural science, of power with knowledge, gave race its singular epistemic purchase on post-Enlightenment thought. Thus the point is not only that the prestige of science afforded an authoritative warrant to the categorical cleavage within humanity that the concept of race ordained. It is rather (or also) that race reconciled and unified two of the most formative—perhaps the two most formative—components of Enlightenment discourse, resolving the tension between improvement and fixity by allocating them differentially. In this regard, race naturalised the theological narrative that was being substantially secularised in Enlightenment political ideology. Whereas the Rousseauian vision of improbability through education recast the Christian possibility of grace (in the case of Jews, of conversion), race could also endow debasement with the fixity of a curse. Race, in short, was endemic to modernity.

The ambivalent tension between these bedrock themes of Enlightenment thinking—taxonomy/fixity versus mutability/improvement—equipped race with a strategic versatility that enabled subject populations to be differentially racialised. Depending on which tendency prevailed, the same progressive hierarchy that could be used to show how colonised people's deficits were anchored in their physiognomy could also be used to show the occurrence of evolutionary progress up the hierarchy. On the basis of the former alternative—savages were degraded and it showed in their bones—massacres and removals could be justified by reference to Natives' inbuilt incorrigibility. There was no reforming them. On the basis of the latter alternative, however—the option of progress—Natives were improvable, even assimilable, and, accordingly, fit for the attentions of missionaries and reformers. Hence some of the most significant opposition to Indian Removal in the Jackson-era USA came from missionaries who did not want their charges to be taken beyond their reach. At the same time, however, and on the basis of the same scale of improbability, Africans became irretrievably destined for slavery.

the investor, the citizen—turn out to be collectively reliant on the continuing violence of colonial expansion. As Manu Vimalassery has pointed out, the very nations whose wealth was Adam Smith's central concern 'were in fact empires'. Imperialism is not the latest stage of capitalism but its foundational warrant. To make the liberal an individual took a cast of thousands, most of them in the wings.

Ideologically, then, colonialism's preaccumulated inheritance consists not only in explicitly xenophobic discourses of human alterity such as scientific racism or the white man's burden. In all sorts of unspecific ways, colonised peoples could be assimilated to nature, placing them on the receiving end of Cartesian dualism and, accordingly, as in need of control. Ultimately, for instance, the expansionist master-narrative that historians have glossed as *terra nullius* relied on this assimilation. On the basis of a vernacular Lockeanism whereby property rights were seen as accruing from the admixture of one's labour with the soil—an entitlement evidenced by agriculture, irrigation, enclosure, centralised governance and a range of other qualifications that Natives were declared to lack—colonisers claimed entitlement to Native territory on the ground that Europeans alone had the purposive rationality required to render land more efficient (that is, capable of sustaining a higher population) than in its natural state, which was the condition in which it would languish if left in Native hands. In contrast to Europeans, Natives had failed to disembed themselves from nature. They remained enchanted, in the most demeaning of senses.

In this wider cultural context, therefore, nature is not the only value that Kenny's latter-day conservationists preserve. Along with nature, they are equipping *terra nullius* with a twenty-first-century style of discursive sustainability. Moreover, in colonialism's Cartesian thematics, the corollary to being assimilated to nature is being inassimilable to culture. In this respect, the unassimilated Native contrasts maximally with *homo economicus* himself, whose formal contractual rationality—mechanical, impersonal, and, above all, context-neutral—rendered him free of historical accretions and, accordingly, maximally adaptable to a society in the making.

The need to accommodate a fractious convergence of settler populations, often bringing long-established metropolitan enmities with them, renders new-world societies susceptible to democratic ideologies that exchange immigrants' historical baggage for the abstract equivalence of egalitarian individualism. As Max Weber seemed to recognise in setting so much of his

from the metropolitan parochialism of this narrative, whereby many of the raw materials of industrial production figure as somehow miraculously (or, at least, internally) conceived, the crucial difference is that, when Europe was piecing together its imperial-industrial-capitalist hegemony, there was no prior Europe already riding on its back. Arriving in Native country, on the other hand, capitalism already contained its own global preaccumulations—including, Russian-doll-like, capitalism itself—along with strategic resources such as the enslavement of Africans.

True, there were rival civilisational conglomerates, in particular the Islamic world, but these proved to be no match once the Atlantic had become a West-European sea. Moreover, Native preaccumulations could themselves facilitate colonial expansion. In the Americas, for example, Natives taught Europeans to grow subsistence crops such as corn and potatoes. In early-colonial Australia, invading colonisers regularly marvelled at the local environment's park-like aspect, counting themselves multiply blessed that 'nature' (including divine providence) should have come to furnish them with ready-made grazing runs. In fact, the Australian landscape's benign aspect was the cumulative consequence of millennia of Indigenous management, in particular the use of fire to reduce undergrowth and to contain spontaneous conflagrations within local limits. Within a few years of Europeans taking over the country and discontinuing Native fire-management practices, the current cycle of massive bushfire disasters was set in train. The land that settlers seize is already value-added. There is no such thing as wilderness, only depopulation.

In replacing Indigenous agency with that of the cosmos, the concept of nature enabled improvements effected by Natives to figure as serendipity. This is an enduring settler theme. As Robert Kenny has recently observed in relation to the romantic strand in contemporary conservation discourse, 'to suggest that pre-settlement Australia was "pristine" is to place Aboriginal Australians in the category nature, and thus deny them humanity.' Marx himself participated in this erasure, depicting capitalism in the Americas as being of the purest historical type, unalloyed by feudal survivals—without Europe, there could be no meaningful history.

In this cutting-out of the Native middleman, *terra nullius* and market economics fuse inseparably, connecting settler capital directly to a landscape miraculously emptied of the accumulated human labour, male and female, that has made it what it is. In the outcome, all the ostensibly self-sustaining actors in liberalism's individualist drama—the entrepreneur, the labourer,

Race's adaptability was sufficient to accommodate the complexity of imperialism's far-flung network of unequal social relations. For every articulation—relations of slavery, of indenture, of dispossession, of compradorship, of (inter)mediation, of commercial exchange—a corresponding racial category could be nominated. This versatility is the key to race's heterogeneity, enabling the diverse range of applied constructs that we shall survey to be expressed in a common, genetically phrased idiom of hierarchy and deficit.

Racialisation

Ideology is, therefore, only part of the story, albeit an important one. In addition to noting race's development as an organised narrative or doctrine, we need to observe it in operation, as a set of classificatory regimes that seek to order subject populations differentially in pursuit of particular historical agendas. To this extent, the term 'racism' seems redundant, since race already is an 'ism'. As performed and contested on the ground, which is this book's focus, race emerges not as singular or unified but as a fertile, Hydra-headed assortment of local practices. To express this applied versatility, we may distinguish between race as doctrine, which is of a piece with Enlightenment thinking and has a measure of discursive coherence, and racialisation as an assortment of local attempts to impose classificatory grids on a variety of colonised populations, to particular though coordinated ends. This book is about racialisation, race in action, which is prior to and not limited to racial doctrine. It argues that different racialising practices seek to maintain population-specific modes of colonial domination through time. This is the sense in which I argue that race constitutes a trace of history. In historical practice, the ideology of race is intrinsically performative, in the sense classically espoused by J. L. Austin and John Searle: rather than simply describing human groups, it brings them into being as inter-relating social categories with behavioural prescriptions to match. Racialisation refers to this active productivity of race, whereby colonialism refashions its human terrain.

It is important to note the priority of practice. Before the eighteenth century, Europeans had not needed the doctrine of race to discriminate against subjugated populations.²⁴ Dispossession, slavery, expulsion, confinement, massacre and other xenophobic practices had been carried on in terms organic to the era concerned, with Christianity typically furnishing an exegetical warrant. Even doctrinally, many of the traits that would become

associated with race had already been incorporated into colonial practice. As many scholars have observed, European traditions provided a demonology of themes and images (the wild man, witches, anthropophagy, nomadism, etc.) that were presupposed within colonialism and displaced onto newly discovered peoples. In Shakespeare alone, the modern populations whose respective racialisations will be analysed below—Black people (Othello), Jews (Shylock) and Native Americans (Caliban)—had already been typified, only not in the language of race. As race emerged in late-eighteenth-century Europe, however, it was the other way round: the discourse presupposed colonialism.

In particular, Jews were initially conspicuous by their absence from the ascending scales of skulls that marked the progression from simian depths up to the West European ideal type, often represented by Winckelman's Apollo Belvedere (who, comically enough, being a statue, did not actually boast a skull). Between the apes and Apollo, these charts placed Africans (or 'Kalmyks') below cranial images that could include ostensibly East Asian and Native American types but not Jews. True, Jews could be said to have had an absent presence, with the lone eminence of Apollo struggling to exclude the Hebrew component from the Hebrew- Hellenic synthesis underlying Pauline Christian culture; but the Jewish element in these early racial hierarchies was at most tacit, in stark contrast to the prominence that representations of Jews would attain in later nineteenth-century racial discourse. As we shall see when we come to consider European antisemitism, it was not just that colonialism exported stereotypes from the legendary traditions of Europe. Reciprocally, colonialism subsequently came to furnish a racialised mythology that could be displaced back onto stigmatised minorities within Europe itself.

In other words, Jews came relatively late to race—or, rather, race came late to Jews. Through colonial practice, a doctrine devised to rank subjugated peoples from outside Europe became discursively available to be redirected inwards, onto emancipated European Jews, refurbishing their theoretically outmoded exteriority. At that point Judaeophobia, an age-old European practice, took on the distinctive features of racial antisemitism, a post-Enlightenment discourse which, as Hannah Arendt pointed out, had been significantly prefigured in the colonial world.

There is a further reason for focusing on practice rather than merely doctrine. No account of race that fails to address its emotive virulence can be adequate. Fear, hatred, rapine, violence, callousness, and cruelty are of the

terially, as a historical endowment of consciousness. Colonisers brought with them historically specific ideologies of race, class, gender and nation that had participated decisively in collective subjugations at home and abroad. As Barbara Fields has observed:

When English servants entered the ring in [colonial] Virginia, they did not enter alone. Instead, they entered in company with the generations who had preceded them in the struggle; and the outcome of those earlier struggles established the terms and conditions for the latest one. But Africans and Afro-West Indians did enter the ring alone.

Unlike enslaved Africans in the Americas, Natives did not enter the ring alone. Their reinforcements were not oceans away. Nevertheless, their histories had equipped them with resources that were not tailored to the unequal confrontation that settlers' endless renewability set in train. Natives' finite local stock was no match for imperialism's global elasticity. Rather, they were reduced to relying on a shrinking pool of indigenous resources whose reproduction had been severely hampered by settler encroachments. The disparity was quantitative not qualitative, a matter of material renewability rather than of cultural aptitudes, the shrinkage of Natives' locally bounded subsistence stocks occurring in concert with, and being part of, the expansion of imperialism's global networks. Moreover, this aggregated historical disparity was telescoped at individual sites of confrontation. In contrast to the cumulative, centuries-long development of industrial capitalism and its global network of social relations, Eurocolonial society arrived in Native country *ex nihilo* (or perhaps *ex machina*) and ready-made, condensing the power and expansive violence of the long run. This pre-formedness, a plenitude that is relatively resistant to local determinations, is colonialism's primary competitive advantage.

There is a crucial difference between preaccumulation and the European experience of primitive accumulation that has figured so prominently in Marxist historiography. This is even apart from a certain Eurocentrism in established Marxist history-writing, which tends to emphasise the final stages of the production process—industrial technologies and the domestic process of class formation that accompanied their development—at the expense of earlier stages of primary production that were often conducted overseas, by subordinated labour not necessarily motivated by the lash of wages. Apart

'previous' accumulation, preaccumulation departs from such predecessors in being externally activated, coming into play in the presence of a countervailing plenitude. Colonialism did not impress its will on a blank slate.

Once established, European colonialism acquired global reach, a characteristic that endowed the project with an effectively unlimited capacity to reproduce itself. In settler colonies, this near inexhaustibility opposed itself to the relative fixity of the Native stock, by which I mean the finite aggregate of material assets that remains locally available for Native societies to reproduce themselves over the long term.

The disparity is crucial. In demographic terms, for instance, it meant that, whereas invasion rendered the Native population subject to extreme reproductive constraints, there were always more settlers where the first ones had come from—which, in the final analysis, meant anywhere else, the settler population being augmentable not only by further cognate settlers but, in addition, by any number of coerced subordinates imported from other sites of exploitation. Economically, Native societies were reduced to generating subsistence from an ever-shrinking repository that, even within territory that remained unconquered, became subject to the depredations of an advance guard of settlement made up of frontier irregulars (with or without auxiliary subordinates), imported livestock, exotic predators, and more besides. The technological and military capacities that settlers inherited from Europe's expansive history are also well known, as is Europeans' acquired immunity to the diseases they imported with them.

On occasion, the advantages could change hands. Thus the horses that facilitated Spanish conquests in the Americas subsequently helped Plains Indians hold off Euroamerican domination until the second half of the nineteenth century, while Maoris adopted the introduced potato, itself a re-exported colonial import, to advantage. In Brazil, runaway slaves escaped on railways built to ship the very coffee they were supposed to be producing.

On the whole, however, settlers brought with them a conquering inheritance that had been forged through centuries of colonial expansion and associated class struggle on an increasingly global scale. The two were inseparable, the cotton that the industrial proletariat made up in Manchester's dark mills being sourced from colonised labour put to work in Egypt, India, and the US Deep South, the two sources of labour further providing an expanding market for the products of their involuntary collaboration.

It is important to understand preaccumulation culturally as well as ma-

essence of race, and any discussion of the phenomenon that overlooks or understates these core features can only miss the point. A comparable problem is raised by accounts of race and racism that try to reduce this pathology of modernity to a rational calculus of interests, so that, to cite but one well-known instance, it was once seen as progressive to attribute the efflorescence of lynching in the southern states of the USA to the depression of the 1890s and to White people's perception that Blacks were rivals for their jobs. While this perceived rivalry may well account for all sorts of ruthless tactics to eliminate Black people from the job market, tactics that would no doubt extend to homicide—especially since the discontinuation of slavery had removed the constraint on killing Black people that their status as valuable property had previously entailed—it fails to account for the demonic redundancy, the step so far over the line that it had to surpass itself, that characterised the surfeit of public violence and cruelty that lynching all of a sudden began to manifest from around the turn of the 1890s.

What kind of rational interest motivates individuals to wrench the teeth, nails and hair, peel the skin, gouge the eyes, castrate, and burn alive someone who is exclaiming in agony? Even harder to explain, how did such practices take place in public, in full daylight, and secure widespread popular endorsement—to the extent that an open trade in commemorative postcards and souvenir body parts developed? How could it happen that, after Sam Hose had been slowly burned and mutilated to death in public in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1892, his knuckles should be placed on display in the window of a grocer's shop in Mitchell Street? I leave the disturbing examples at that, but they could be multiplied at length. I cite them in order to stress that no rational calculus of interests can account for such redundant elaborations. Without some sense of the visceral force of race's appeal, we cannot begin to account for it, let alone do anything about it.

As a bodily attribute, race is not so much a concept as a sensation, mobilising the most immediate of nervous responses. Hence it exceeds rational calculation—as Arendt put it, race has survived libraries of refutation. On the day-to-day level, race penetrates the most mundane moments in life, acquiring recognition and reinforcement at the flick of an eye, a self-policing microphysics of biopower that incessantly implicates and re-implicates all parties to the encounter, as in some gigantic hall of mirrors ('Look, a Negro!'). Through such quotidian interchanges, race recruits biology to install the international division of labour at the level of individuals' own sensory

experience, soliciting reflex allegiance to the otherwise disenchanting categories made available in capitalism's secular set of social relations. Offsetting the theoretically unrestricted social mobility that the 'free' market introduced, race provided a stable zone of ascribed and continuing identities, binding social reproduction to biological reproduction. Hence the fraught atmosphere of miscegenation discourse, in which sexual and social relations meet on the surface of the human body. In its vulnerability, promulgating absolute boundaries that could not be relied on to exist, miscegenation discourse was never far from the surpassing barbarities of lynching.

Under what circumstances, then, does racialisation occur? When, to put it bluntly, does race kick in? In this book, I argue that racialisation represents a response to the crisis occasioned when colonisers are threatened with the requirement to share social space with the colonised. In the Indigenous case, this threat arises in the wake of the frontier, when Natives become physically contained within settler societies. As we shall see, in both Australia and the USA, racial discourse intensified in the post-frontier era, with Indigenous people becoming subject to the divisive elaborations of blood quantum discourse. Alternatively, where the enslaved or the internally colonised are concerned, as in the cases of the American slaves and the European Jews whose experiences we shall be considering, racial discourse has intensified in the wake of emancipation, which removes a juridical barrier that had previously set them apart from the dominant society as decisively as the physical frontier distanced Natives. In the context of this challenge, race's role as a byproduct of democracy becomes particularly apparent in its retrieval of the inequities that the extension of citizenship has theoretically abolished. As Vann Woodward observed of segregation in the US South:

The barriers of racial discrimination mounted in direct ratio with the tide of political democracy among whites. In fact, an increase of Jim Crow laws upon the statute books of a state is almost an accurate index of the decline of the reactionary regimes of the Redeemers and the triumph of white democratic movements.

Race enabled universality to presuppose distinction.

It is important to make clear that the difference between these two occasions for racialisation—emancipation and territorial engulfment—is not the Cartesian opposition between, on the one hand, a social factor (emanci-

enough, as is its legal function of marking the uneven distribution of juridical statuses and rights between communities. Morally, race warrants uneven standards of treatment for different human groups, so it is only to be expected that social institutions from the domestic realm (the family) through to the most public of arenas (government) should be profoundly marked by race. Discursively, racialised groups are typically also gendered, as in the feminised 'Asiatic' male, while racial aesthetics are closely bound up with standards of beauty and ugliness, the quality of darkness falling on the wrong side of one of the deepest archetypal polarities in Western mythology.

Moreover, being so closely tied to biological reproduction, a heterosexual charge attaches to race that precipitates extreme sanctions and behaviours. Race's intimate neurophysiological anchorage—to share a race is to share a body—makes for a cathected mode of belonging that partakes of the emotional intensity of family ties, whose sexual insulation warrants the most extreme of sanctions. Thus it is no accident that the pre-eminent metaphor to be applied in twentieth-century racial discourse should be that of blood, the very quantity that, in being thicker than water, sacralises family relations, setting them apart from the generality of moral norms. As some of the following chapters will illustrate, this particularly applies to miscegenation discourse, which can provide a vantage point for comparing different regimes of race.

Preaccumulation

In addition to its synchronic gathering together of colonialism's coexistent social discourses, race compresses colonialism's cumulative history. Colonisers—at least, the successful ones—arrive already vested with a multitude of historical preconditions that equip them to prevail in their encounters with local populations. These preconditions, a kind of historical capital, bring together a range of economic, technological, military, cultural, and moral attributes that combine centuries of Eurocolonial history. Moreover, in any given case, this cumulative historical plenitude confronts an independently accumulated Indigenous plenitude with composite outcomes that are unique to each particular situation. I shall refer to both the historical endowment that colonisers bring with them and to Natives' countervailing historical plenitudes as preaccumulation. While derived from Karl Marx's concept of primitive accumulation, itself an adaptation of Adam Smith's

economic, political, moral, mythic, legal, institutional, sexual, and aesthetic—the whole gamut of social discourse. I use the term ‘regime’ to express this comprehensiveness. Conceptually, the idea of a regime is indebted to Marcel Mauss’s ‘total social fact’. Semantically, however, the unwieldiness of Mauss’s term aside, the word ‘fact’ is too static and too politically neutral for what I want to express, which, apart from being mobile and active (race being high-maintenance), is quintessentially political, race being an instrument of overlordship.

Hence my preference for the term ‘regime’, which combines active direction and political dominance with an implication of accompanying contestation and resistance. The structures are not inert. They require constant maintenance and refurbishment, a contestatory process that, as we shall see, causes regimes of race to shift across time, taking on transformed modalities that bear the traces of anticolonial practice. Race, it cannot be stressed strongly enough, is a process, not an ontology, its varying modalities so many dialectical symptoms of the ever-shifting hegemonic balance between those with a will to colonise and those with a will to be free, severally racialised in relation to each other. Race registers the state of colonial hostilities. The common factor is Whiteness. Amidst all the differences distinguishing the various regimes of race that we shall examine, the overriding goal is White supremacy.

Throughout this book, therefore, regimes of race do not figure as faits accomplis, as transcending history, but as ever-incomplete projects whereby colonisers repetitively seek to impose and maintain White supremacy. There is nothing stable about race, nothing unchallengeable. Even in the heart of the metropolis, even where the basic distinctions of East and West, European and Arab, were concerned, as Saree Makdisi has recently brought to light:

It took time for these kinds of constructs to develop in a self-sustaining way ... and for that to happen both population and space had to be configured and reconfigured, managed and manipulated, in order to eventually allow the self/other opposition to work on a large—racial or civilizational or even simply national—scale.

Race’s gathering together of the full range of social discourse is observable everywhere. Being central to colonialism, a system that appropriates and exploits land and labour, race’s economic and political dimensions are obvious

pation) and, on the other, a pre-social or environmental one (territorial engulfment). Both are social factors. The governing settler-colonial imperative being the acquisition and retention of territory, its transfer from Native ownership requires the mobilisation of technologies of violence together with the social relations that underpin their deployment. Moreover, once engulfment has taken place—on the ending of the frontier—the obstruction that Natives present to the development of settler society ceases to be primarily physical, as in the frontier balance of violence, and persists as an exotically constituted set of alternative—and, even more inconveniently, prior—sovereignties, an intrinsically social condition. Under these circumstances, exclusion does not eliminate the Native counterclaim to the territory that settlers have transferred from their possession. Rather, exclusion merely preserves Native sovereignty in a separate realm that continues in parallel to the settler one.

This consideration does not apply in the case of imported populations, who are held to have surrendered their sovereignties before arrival; a formula that cannot be applied to people who were there before the settlers themselves arrived. Assimilation—the non-homicidal, or not necessarily homicidal, dissolution of Native difference into the settler mainstream—is a characteristically post-frontier attempt to eliminate the obstruction presented by the persistence of Native sovereignties along with their attendant territorial counterclaim. This process is no less social than emancipation. Both social goals—exclusion and assimilation—are pursued by means of race; exclusion being sought through eternalised constructs that rely on the theme of fixity in Enlightenment scientific realism, while assimilation is sought through permeable constructs that rely on the ethic of improvement in Enlightenment political discourse.

It is crucial to note that the mutability of Native bloodlines is just as positively constructed as the fixity ascribed to the excluded. The propensity to vanish is no less essentialised than the propensity not to. Thus, accounts of race in the USA that marginalise the unstable racialisation of Indigenous people in comparison to the ineradicability ascribed to Black heredity are participating in the very phenomenon that they purport to analyse. This is also the case where race itself is depicted as only encompassing one of its variants—the one involving fixity—at the expense of assimilationism’s soluble constructs. Significantly, this scholarly deficiency is less of a problem in Australia, where, with the notable exception of Pacific labourers indentured into the Queensland sugar industry, the economic counterparts to enslaved peo-

ple in the USA—convicts and indenturees—were overwhelmingly White, the racialisation of Indigenous people being correspondingly less overshadowed in recent Australian scholarship.

Whether presented juridically or geographically, therefore, the threat to social space is no mere metaphor. Rather, in the most concrete of both practical and geographical senses, and often simultaneously, race and place are inextricable. The simplest definition of Indigenous people, obviously enough, is that they are the only ones who have not come from somewhere else. In US cities, these transnational somewhere-elses find approximate re-configuration in the ethnic zoning of residential neighbourhoods, where locality recapitulates the myriad historical migrations whose convergence makes up the settler present, patchily reconfiguring imperialism's global complexity at the local level. No less concretely, in the US South, the defining feature of an 'uppity black'—which is to say, a candidate for lynching—was a failure to know their place, while the thoroughly racialised figure of the 'wetback' signifies a history of crossing over. In Australia, the settler euphemism of choice for the massacring of Aboriginal people, 'dispersal', was as inherently spatial as was its material outcome. In antisemitic parlance, Jews somehow managed to combine confinement to the Pale of Settlement—or, locally, to the ghetto—with universal wandering. As apartheid-era South African Prime Minister B. J. Vorster said: 'If I were to wake up one morning and find myself a black man, the only major difference would be geographical.'

Thus we should extend Mary Douglas's timeless insight that dirt is matter out of place to the human domain: race denotes certain peoples as being out of place, rendering the subordinate populations concerned inherently dirty, as we see in the ubiquitous linkage of race and hygiene. The primal threat posed by contamination sheds some light on the barbarity characterising colonisers' treatment of subject populations. To contaminate is to invade. Race's deep anatomical moorings bring together geographical and physiological mappings so that a people in the wrong place is experienced as an assault on the body, summoning a reflex response which, though collectively enacted, is personally experienced at a powerfully intimate level. As Douglas also noted, cleansing is a response to danger, to the existential threat that dirt poses to purity. The remedy for a people being out of place, after all, is ethnic cleansing.

Race would have been redundant in the mediaeval ghetto. When everyone, or practically everyone, was either Jewish—and, accordingly, in-

side—or Gentile—and, accordingly, outside—there was little to distinguish who you were from where you were. The algebra of inequality—inclusion versus exclusion, exploitation versus privilege, purity versus danger—was built into the landscape. As such, knowledge was local, in the most literal sense, a capacity to place each other that paired anonymity with anomaly. In being renowned for wandering—a distinctive accomplishment, born of expulsion—'the Jew' gathered the insecurity of enclosure unto himself. When it confronts modernity, local knowledge struggles to maintain its anchorage in the consensual foundations of a situated community. The first time he attended a segregated theatre, Gustave de Beaumont, Alexis de Tocqueville's travelling companion in 'Jacksonian America', found his eye drawn to a dazzling beauty seated in the mulatto section, whose complexion was perfectly white. With precocious ethnographic decorum, he entered, as he put it, into the prejudices of his neighbour:

I asked him how a woman of English origin could be so lacking in shame as to seat herself among the Africans.

'That woman', he replied, 'is colored.'

'What? Colored? She is whiter than a lily!'

'She is colored,' he repeated coldly; 'local tradition has established her ancestry, and everyone knows that she had a mulatto among her forebears.'

In the absence of local knowledge, race restores place, compensating for anonymity. In the contemporary United States, to be the wrong colour is to live on the wrong side of the tracks. Beaumont happened on a revealingly transitional moment. Had he returned a decade or two later, the beauty's mulatto status could as well have depended on the perceived shading of her inner wrist. In the fluid spaces of urban modernity, as Malinda Lowery has remarked, 'where a black person's inferior economic status could not be assumed', race made the difference.

Regimes of Race

The applied focus on race as practice does not mean that its doctrinal formulation is unimportant. Rather, racial doctrine is one among a number of resources that a given regime of race coordinates and mobilises, others being